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Diluting the Power of the Private Attorney
General to Enforce Environmental Laws: The
Conflict Between Clean Water Act Citizen
Suits and the Bankruptcy Code
Automatic Stay
Anne Christenson*
Without [citizen suits], increasingly we will find the frustration
which is already a matter of grave concern in other areas, the
powerlessness of the individual to influence even those things
adversely affecting his [or her] environment, heightened to a
point where there is an absolute final conclusion made that
the [glovernment doesn't work.'
An Introduction to the Conflict
The discharge of waste into our nation's waters by corporate
polluters frustrates and enrages many environmentally concerned
citizens. Their frustration is compounded when polluting corpora-
tions file bankruptcy petitions. Bankruptcy filings, which stay
nearly all suits against debtors,2 effectively shield corporations
from citizen suits for injunctive relief brought under the Clean
Water Act (CWA). Not allowing citizen suits against bankrupt,
corporate polluters, in the absence of adequate government en-
forcement, deprives citizens of their statutory authority to enforce
the CWA against permit violators. Because citizen suits are an in-
tegral part of the CWA's enforcement scheme, the preclusion of
citizen suits diminishes the CWA's effectiveness in preserving our
nation's waters.
Precluding a citizen suit against a polluting debtor, when a
government suit would be allowed to proceed, contravenes Con-
* B.A., St. Olaf College, 1988; J.D., University of Minnesota, 1992. The author
would like to thank Charles Nauen, whose dedication to environmental citizen suits
inspired this article, and Jill Fedje, Emad Tinawi, and Eila Savela for their encour-
agement, support, and editorial assistance.
1. Water Pollution Control Act Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcommr on
Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 1019 (1971) (statement of Senator Hart).
2. See infra notes 12 and 28 (automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code
and the governmental unit exception).
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gress' unequivocal intent to include the citizen suit provision as a
vital enforcement mechanism of the CWA. The unequal treatment
of citizen suits also sanctions continuing pollution by corporate
debtors and undermines the role of citizens in preserving environ-
mental integrity. Because both the government and citizen groups
have been given the statutory authority to oversee and help ensure
the preservation of the environment, an action brought by a citizen
group against a polluting debtor should not be precluded by the
automatic stay when the same action brought by the government
would be excepted from the stay.
Congress recognized the need for citizen involvement in pre-
serving environmental integrity and policing increasing corporate
pollution when it enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(CWA).3 The Act "established a permit-based scheme . . . re-
quirliing] water pollution dischargers to comply with standards set
by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)."4
"In contrast to the previous policy of post-discharge water quality
regulation, the Act established a new system of permits which reg-
ulated discharge limits before pollutants entered the navigable wa-
ters."5 The permits are issued by the EPA, but may be enforced
either by the EPA or by the state.6
As a response to the slow pace of federal enforcement of the
CWA, Congress enacted section 505, 7 which expressly makes citi-
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982), as amended by Water Quality Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987) [hereinafter Clean Water Act or CWA].
4. Gail J. Robinson, Interpreting the Citizen Suit Prevision of the Clean
Water Act, 37 Case W. Res. 515, 515 (1986-87).
Section 1311(b) of the Act directs the EPA to set effluent limitations
prescribing the technological control standards that dischargers must
meet and to set compliance deadlines. These limitations are enforced
through the Act's permit program. Section 1311(a) declares the dis-
charge of pollutants unlawful unless the discharger has acquired a per-
mit, while § 1342(a)(1) states that permits must require dischargers to
comply with effluent limitations.
Id. at n.2.
5. Lisa Marie Kuhn, The Clean Water Act: Citizen Suits No Longer a Valid
Enforcement Tool for Past Violations, 34 Wash. U.J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 413, 418
(1988). "Congress envisioned this new system of permits setting effluent discharge
limitations as a more direct approach to eliminate water pollution." Id. at 419 n.26.
6. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (EPA shall issue the requisite discharge permits);
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (EPA may approve state-administered permit programs pro-
vided the state has the ability to implement the program); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b)(2)(B)(7) (state seeking EPA approval must have the means to enforce
permit condition); 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (EPA may seek injunctions, civil penalties, or
criminal penalties for permit violators).
7. "[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf-i) against
any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limi-
tation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the [aidministrator or a [s]tate
with respect to such a standard or limitation .... 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
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zen suits a part of the enforcement scheme by allowing citizens to
sue permit violators. The inclusion of the citizen suit provision in
the CWA reflects Congress' intent to ensure that the Act will be
enforced.8 Congress made "a deliberate choice... to widen citizen
access to the courts, as a supplemental and effective assurance that
the Act would be implemented and enforced." 9 The legislative his-
tory of the citizen suit provision indicates that "[c]itizens should be
unconstrained to bring these actions."'10 Clearly, suits by citizens
represent a vital enforcement mechanism of the CWA.
When a corporate polluter seeks the protection of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, however, it can shield itself from citizen suits and
thus deter enforcement of the CWA. By filing a petition for reor-
ganization under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code,l" an automatic stay is enacted which prohibits "the com-
mencement or continuation.., of a judicial... action or proceed-
ing."' 2 This provision has prohibited citizen environmental groups
from suing bankrupt corporations which continue to engage in ille-
gal polluting activities.13 Because citizen suits are a vital means of
enforcing the CWA and government enforcement is often inade-
8. Robinson, supra note 4, at 519.
9. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). "[S]tate and local governments have not responded adequately.... It is
clear that enforcement must be toughened if we are to meet the national deadlines.
More tools are needed, and the [flederal presence and backup authority must be in-
creased." Gail K. Nagel, Environmental Law--Citizen Suits and Recovery of Civil
Penalties, 36 Kan. L. Rev. 529, 532 n.25 (1988) (citation omitted); see also S. Rep.
No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1970) (purpose of citizen suit provision includes
prodding government to enforce).
10. Robinson, supra note 4, at 520 n.30.
11. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1978) (amended 1986) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code].
12. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title... operates as a stay, appli-
cable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(3).
13. See, e.g., Revere Copper Products, Inc. v. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater,
Inc. (In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.), 29 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 32
Bankr. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text (court re-
fused to interpret exception to automatic stay for governmental units, 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b)(4), to apply to a citizen environmental group).
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quate or nonexistent, the automatic stay, in effect, provides bank-
rupt corporations with a license to continue polluting in violation
of their CWA permits.
This article describes the requirements for bringing a CWA
citizen suit and explains the purpose of the citizen suit provision:
to allow private attorneys general suits as an alternative, enforce-
ment method to government enforcement of the CWA. In its dis-
cussion of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay, this article
examines the exception for governmental units' 4 and analyzes
cases allowing suits by the government for non-monetary, injunc-
tive relief against bankrupt polluters to proceed despite the corpo-
rations' bankruptcy filings. Environmental citizen suits seeking
identical relief, however, have been precluded by the courts' inter-
pretation of these provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, an interpre-
tation which is detrimental to the enforcement of the CWA. This
article argues that citizen suits to enjoin polluting debtors should
be excepted from the automatic stay in order to compel bankrupt
corporations to comply with environmental laws.
This article concludes with two suggestions for reform. Ide-
ally, Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code to except envi-
ronmental citizen suits for injunctive relief from the automatic
stay. Alternatively, courts should interpret the automatic stay pro-
vision to permit environmental citizen suits for injunctions to pro-
ceed. Because true governmental units would be allowed to sue to
enjoin bankrupt violators of the CWA, citizen suits seeking identi-
cal relief are not harassing and should not be stayed in order to
protect the debtor. When government enforcement is inadequate
or nonexistent, citizen suits are a vital means of enforcing the
CWA and should be allowed to proceed against a bankrupt corpo-
ration in order to protect the integrity of the environment.
An Illustration of the Conflict
An example of a court giving higher priority to debtor protec-
tion than to environmental protection is found in In re Czateaugay
Corp.15 The New York bankruptcy court refused to allow a citi-
zens' environmental group, Minnesota Sportfishing Congress
(Sportfishing), to bring suit against LTV Steel Mining Company
(LTV) to enjoin LTV from its continuous, ongoing violations of its
CWA permit. Since 1962 LTV has owned and operated an iron ore,
open pit mine called Dunka Mine near Babbitt, Minnesota. Dunka
14. See infra note 28 (11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) exception to the automatic stay for
governmental units).
15. 118 Bankr. 19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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Mine's operations entail removing the overlying rock and soil,
known as overburden, which contains high levels of metal com-
pounds and sulfates hazardous to the environment.'6
For almost thirty years, this hazardous material has been
stockpiled along the perimeter of the mine pit. The metals and
sulfates in the overburden leach into the water, which is dis-
charged near the stockpiles.17 The quality of the water discharged
is subject to effluent limitations set by the EPA and enforced by a
CWA permit.18 Consistently, the level of hazardous metals and
sulfates contained in Dunka Mine's discharges has exceeded that
allowed by its permit.19 As recently as May 1990, a new seep with
metal and sulfate concentrations in violation of the permit was
found by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (PCA) at the
site.20 This ongoing violation demonstrates that a significant water
pollution problem continues to exist at the Dunka Mine.21
In 1985 a stipulation agreement between the PCA and Erie
Mining Company, LTV's predecessor in interest, purported to ad-
dress Dunka Mine's continuing violations.22 This plan, however,
was developed when the mining industry was depressed and
Dunka Mine's operations were substantially decreased. Since 1986
LTV has resumed significant mining activities. 23 As a result, the
stipulation agreement has become outdated and ineffective in con-
trolling the widespread, water pollution caused by Dunka Mine's
excessive discharge of hazardous pollutants.24
The polluted, discharging water flows through EM-1, which is
the last, effluent measuring point. The violations of water quality
goals at this juncture are especially crucial because from EM-1 the
contaminated water enters the surrounding wetlands and flows
through a creek into Bob Bay, Birch Lake, and subsequently into
the Boundary Waters Canoe Area, a protected wildlife area in
northern Minnesota and Canada.25 Thus, the pollution caused by
16. See Affidavit of Toivo M. Maki at paras. 5-6, In re Chateaugay Corp., 118
Bankr. 19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (No. 86 B 11273 (BRL)) [hereinafter Maki]; see
also Chris M. Sande, Memorandum on Sportfishing Motion for Relief from Bank-
ruptcy Stay at 1, In re Chateaugay Corp. (No. 86 B 11273 (BRL)) [hereinafter
Memorandum].
17. Maki, supra note 16, at para. 8.
18. See supra note 4 (explaining 11 U.S.C. § 1311 permit system).
19. See Stipulation Agreement at 10-12, In re Chateaugay Corp. (No. 86 B 11273
(BRL)); see also Memorandum, supra note 16, at 1.
20. Memorandum, supra note 16, at 1.
21. Id.
22. Stipulation Agreement, supra note 19; see Maki, supra note 16, at para. 11.
23. Memorandum, supra note 16, at 2.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 4.
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the discharges' high metal and sulfate concentrations is not con-
fined to the immediately adjacent wetlands. These hazardous pol-
lutants spread to the surrounding, pristine, wilderness areas,
adversely affecting wildlife and its enjoyment by people such as
the members of Minnesota Sportfishing.26
In 1986 LTV and its affiliated entities filed for reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.27 This filing activated
the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision. In 1990, because
of the mining company's continuing noncompliance with its permit
and the government's inaction to adequately enforce the permit,
Sportfishing filed a motion to lift the automatic stay in order to
bring its citizen suit against LTV to compel LTV to stop polluting
Minnesota's waters. Pursuant to section 505 of the CWA,
Sportfishing sought to act as a private attorney general and to
bring a citizen suit in. the absence of adequate, government en-
forcement. Thus, Sportfishing asserted that it should be consid-
ered a governmental unit and its suit should be allowed under the
exception to the automatic stay for governmental units that allows
suits by governmental units to proceed despite the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition.28
Sportfishing's proposed litigation sought "to monitor post-pe-
tition remedial activities and to enjoin or abate ongoing viola-
tions." 29 Sportfishing did not wish to obtain or enforce a money
judgment against LTV. It only sought to halt LTV's ongoing pollu-
tion.30 Despite Sportfishing's goal of injunctive relief for LTV's
26. See Stipulation Agreement, supra note 19, at 8. (Studies showed high con-
centrations of metals in the tissues of water lilies and the flesh of northern pike in
the water near Dunka Mine.)
27. The PCA recognized that the Chapter 11 filing meant that:
expenditures necessary to accomplish actions described in the Stipula-
tion Agreement may be subject to prior approval [by] the bankruptcy
court. .. . In the event the [b]ankruptcy [clourt approval is necessary
and the court determines not to approve an expenditure required by
this agreement, the [sitate retains the right to pursue other remedies
to require Erie to comply with [s]tate and [flederal pollution laws.
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency Amendment No. 1 to Water Quality Stipula-
tion Agreement at 2, In re Chateaugay Corp. (No. 86 B 11273 (BRL)).
28. In re Chateaugay Corp., 118 Bankr. at 21. The Bankruptcy Code provides
an exception for governmental units bringing suit against bankrupt corporations:
The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ...
does not operate as a stay-
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or
continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to en-
force such governmental unit's police or regulatory power.
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).
29. 118 Bankr. at 23.
30. Id. Sportfishing recognized that a claim based on pre-petition environmen-
tal violations would be discharged in bankruptcy. Id. "So long as there is a pre-
[Vol. 9:469
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ongoing violations of the CWA, the court nonetheless refused to al-
low Sportfishing's citizen suit to proceed.31
The court declined to interpret the Bankruptcy Code's excep-
tion to the automatic stay for a governmental unit suing to enforce
its police and regulatory powers to include suits by private attor-
neys general.3 2 Furthermore, the court refused to grant Sportfish-
ing relief from the automatic stay,33 citing the legislative history of
the provision as "indicat[ing] that Congress intended that the scope
of the automatic stay be broad in order to effectuate its protective
purposes on behalf of both debtors and creditors." 4 The court
heavily favored the Bankruptcy Code's goal of protecting the
debtor over the CWA's goal of protecting the environment. In so
doing, the court allowed LTV's bankrupt status to shield it from a
citizen suit to enjoin LTV from polluting and to compel LTV to
comply with its CWA permit.
In support of its decision not to allow Sportfishing's citizen
suit to proceed, the court found that LTV's environmental viola-
tions were "already being addressed by the Mining Company and
the state agency charged with enforcement of the environmental
laws."35 The PCA's efforts to address LTV's violations through
the stipulation agreement, however, had not resulted in forcing
the mining company to comply with its permit. The lack of ade-
quate enforcement by the PCA was the impetus for Sportfishing's
attempted citizen suit. The court, however, ignored the outdated
stipulation agreement's inability to control LTV's pollution of Min-
nesota waters.
In re Chateaugay Corp. illustrates the tension between the
federal Bankruptcy Code and federal environmental laws-specifi-
cally, the conflict created by sections 362(a)(3)(automatic stay pro-
petition triggering event, i.e., the release or threatened release of hazardous waste,
the claim is dischargeable, regardless of when the claim for relief may be in all re-
spects ripe for adjudication." Id. (citation omitted).
31. Id. at 24.
32. Id. at 22.
33. Id. at 24. Sportfishing had requested, as an alternative to proceeding pursu-
ant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), that the bankruptcy court grant it relief from the stay
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1):
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the
court shall grant relief from a stay provided under subsection (a) of
this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or condition-
ing such stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest
in property of such party in interest.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).
34. 118 Bankr. at 22; see infra note 82 and accompanying text (legislative his-
tory of the automatic stay).
35. 118 Bankr. at 23.
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vision) and 362(b)(4)(exception for governmental unit) of the
Bankruptcy Code and section 1365 (citizen suit provision) of the
Clean Water Act. Courts have refused to treat citizen environ-
mental groups acting as private attorneys general as governmental
units.36 As a result, private attorneys general are deprived of their
statutory authority to sue corporate polluters when the corpora-
tions file bankruptcy petitions. The history of the CWA citizen
suit provision indicates that Congress intended citizen suits against
bankrupt polluters to be an integral part of the enforcement
scheme;37 however, the courts' narrow interpretation of the auto-
matic stay provision's exception to preclude citizen suits strips the
CWA of much of its potency in protecting the environment.3s
The policy behind the automatic stay is to protect the debtor
from harassing and unnecessary suits.3 9 When a bankrupt corpo-
ration continues to violate environmental laws, and the govern-
ment is not adequately enforcing the laws, however, citizen suits
are necessary. A citizen suit for an injunction may be an inconven-
ience to the debtor, but the automatic stay should not protect the
debtor from a mere inconvenience when the environment suffers
as a result. By stifling legitimate citizen suits, the Bankruptcy
Code undermines the CWA's expressed purpose: to preserve the
environmental integrity of our nation's waters.40 Refusing to al-
low citizen suits for injunctive relief against bankrupt polluters to
proceed, in lieu of government enforcement, endangers the envi-
ronment and shields the debtor from having to comply with the
CWA.
I. The Structure of and Policy Behind the Clean Water Act's Citizen
Suit Provision
"The objective of [the Clean Water Act] is to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
[n]ation's waters."4 1 The plain language of the citizen suit provi-
sion, as well as the legislative history of the CWA, indicate that
36. See, e.g., Revere Copper Products, Inc. v. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater,
Inc. (In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.), 29 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), eff'd, 32
Bankr. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text (courts'
reasoning for not treating citizen groups as governmental units for purposes of the
exception to the automatic stay).
37. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text; see infra note 42 (legislative
history indicates the vital role of citizen suits in enforcement of environmental
laws).
38. See infra notes 111-46 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.




this objective is to be realized, at least in part, through suits insti-
gated by citizens.42 "Perhaps more than any other [flederal pro-
gram, the regulation of environmental quality is of fundamental
concern to the public. It is appropriate, therefore, that an opportu-
nity be provided for citizen involvement." 43
There are essentially four requirements which a citizen envi-
ronmental group must fulfill in order to bring a citizen suit under
section 505 of the CWA.44 First, article III of the United States
Constitution imposes the requirement of standing,45 which was in-
terpreted by the United States Supreme Court in the context of
citizen environmental suits in Sierra Club v. Morton.4 6 A citizen
group can demonstrate standing by showing an injury to an aes-
thetic or environmental interest.4 7
To establish standing, a citizen environmental group "must
allege injury in fact to an individual member of the group due to
defendant's violations."48 In any environmental lawsuit, including
a CWA citizen suit under section 505, the plaintiff must demon-
strate a substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress
the injury claimed.49 The injury:
may be established by showing that a defendant has 1) dis-
charged some pollutant in concentrations greater than allowed
by its permit 2) into a waterway in which the plaintiffs have
an interest that is or may be adversely affected by the pollu-
tant and that 3) this pollutant causes or contributes to the
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (citizen suit provision); see also H.R. Rep. No. 911, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1972). ("[S]teps are necessary to restore the public's confidence
and to open wide the opportunity for the public to participate in a meaningful way
in the decisions of government.")
43. Robinson, supra note 4, at 519 n.24 (citation omitted).
44. Section 505(g) of the CWA defines citizen as "a person or persons having an
interest which is or may be adversely affected." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g). "'Citizen' . . .
has been held to include environmental organizations representing citizen mem-
bers." Gretchen W. Anderson, Uniformity in Clean Water Act Enforcement Ap-
plying a Five Year Federal Statute of Limitations to Citizen Suits, 6 Temp. Envtl.
L. & Tech. J. 49, 53 (1987).
45. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
46. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
47. Id, at 734. "Mhe 'injury in fact' test requires more than an injury to a cog-
nizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself [or herself]
among the injured." Id. at 734-35. "Reflecting Congress' desire to facilitate en-
forcement, the standing requirement under section 505 is fairly broad .... [Tihe
'interest' involved may include aesthetic or conservational interests, historic preser-
vation, and recreational or economic interests." Lauren Mileo O'Sullivan, Citizen
Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 38 Rutgers L. Rev. 813, 819 (1986). "The Morton
standard was specifically adopted by the conference committee in its report." Id. at
n.51 (citation omitted).
48. Charles N. Nauen, Citizen Environmental Lawsuits After Gwaltney: The
Thrill of Victory or the Agony of Defeat?, 15 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 327, 333 (1989).
49. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20
(1978).
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kinds of injuries alleged by the plaintiffs.50
The three remaining requirements for bringing a citizen suit
under the CWA are imposed by the statute. The notice require-
ment provides that the citizen may not file suit until sixty days af-
ter giving notice to the EPA, the state and the violator.51 The lack
of diligent prosecution requirement mandates that a citizen filing a
suit must show that the state or the EPA is not diligently prose-
cuting the violator in a court of the United States. 52 The final re-
quirement for commencing a citizen suit has been recently
clarified by the United States Supreme Court in Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation.53 The Court held
that section 505 of the CWA does not permit citizens to sue for
wholly past violations; citizens must "allege a state of either con-
tinuous or intermittent violation-that is, a reasonable likelihood
that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the future."5 4 Ac-
50. Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc.,
913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990).
51. No action may be commenced-
prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged vi-
olation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the [s]tate in which the alleged
violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limi-
tation, or order ....
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A).
52. No action may be commenced-
if .the Administrator or [s]tate has commenced and is diligently prose-
cuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a
[s]tate to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order,
but in any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may
intervene as a matter of right.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). "Recent litigation also has focused on what constitutes a
'court' action. A citizen suit is prohibited if an agency administrative proceeding, a
consent decree, or a state administrative proceeding [that is currently pending] is a
'court' action." Nagel, supra note 9, at 534 n.34. See Friends of the Earth v. Consol-
idated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1985) (consent orders resulting from state
agency action are not court proceedings); Student Pub. Interest Research Group of
N.J. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 1132 (3d Cir. 1985) (EPA ad-
ministrative enforcement action is not a court proceeding). Because other environ-
mental statutes have provisions which render agency proceedings alone sufficient
to bar citizen suits, the absence of such a provision in the CWA "supports the view
that only a court action can preclude citizen suits brought under that Act." Robin-
son, supra note 4, at 518. "Congress has frequently demonstrated its ability to ex-
plicitly provide that either an administrative proceeding or a court action will
preclude citizen suits.... Had Congress wished to impose this broader prohibition
on citizen suits under the Clean Water Act, it could easily have done so. It did not."
Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d at 63.
53. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
54. Id. at 57. The Court relied on:
the pervasive use of the present tense throughout section 505 of the
CWA, as well as in other environmental citizen statutes. This fact,
coupled with the statutory definition of "citizen," led the Court to con-
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cording to one commentator, the Supreme Court's holding in
Gwaltney limits citizen suits to injunctive relief. "Violators not
pursued by the EPA face no threat of penalty for past wrongs....
A violator is thus immune from any reprimand for damage it has
already imposed on the environment, seemingly without regard to
whether past violations caused irreparable damage." 55
Despite the limitation placed on citizen suits by Gwaltney,
citizen suits seeking injunctions for ongoing violations remain a
proper and vital means of enforcing the CWA. "It is undisputed
that a citizen-plaintiff may seek relief, in the form of injunction
and civil penalties, for violations occurring on or after the date the
lawsuit is commenced."56  Because the civil penalty provided for
in the CWA must be paid to the United States Treasury and is not
recoverable by the plaintiff, citizen-plaintiffs have no remedy in
damages.5 7 Citizen enforcement suits, then, are initiated against
polluters not to obtain a private, pecuniary remedy, but rather to
promote the health and safety of the citizen-plaintiffs and the gen-
eral public.
This public purpose of citizen suits is reflected in the legisla-
tive history of the CWA.ms "[Public] participation not only builds
public confidence in the government's efforts to improve water
quality, but also ensures enforcement of the Act."' 59 The 1987
amendments to the CWA6O maintained the citizen suit provision,
illustrating that Congress still insists on enforcement and contin-
clude that "the harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit lies in
the present or the future, not in the past."
Nauen, supra note 48, at 346-47 (citation omitted).
55. Kuhn, supra note 5, at 432.
56. Nauen, supra note 48, at 344. Under the CWA, citizens may seek civil pen-
alties, which as of February 4, 1987, were increased from $10,000 to $25,000 per day
per violation. Id. at 340; see 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). Civil penalties are paid to the
United States Treasury, and plaintiffs may recover litigation costs if the suit is suc-
cessful. O'Sullivan, supra note 47, at 819.
57. O'Sullivan, supra note 47, at 818-19. See Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 580 F.
Supp. 862, 863 n.1 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, appeal dismissed, 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984);
City of Evansville, Ind. v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.
1979) (citizen suit provision authorizes no damages award to citizen plaintiffs), cert
denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
58. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
59. Robinson, supra note 4, at 519. Because the CWA citizen suit provision is
derived from the Clean Air Act's (CAA) citizen suit provision, the legislative his-
tory of the CAA is also relevant in determining congressional intent. See, e.g.,
Hunter C. Quick, Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., Inc.: A Reaffirmation of Citizen
Suits Policy Within the Cean Air Act, 82 W. Va. L. Rev. 709, 710-11 (1980). (One
purpose of CAA citizen suit provision is to widen "citizen access to the courts, en-
abling citizens to participate in the fight against air pollution, which directly affects
their health and safety.")
60. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987).
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ues to strongly support citizen suits as a means of enforcement. 6 1
Congress has persistently included the citizen suit provision
in the CWA and, at the same time, appropriated no additional
funds or personnel to the EPA for enforcement of the Act.62
These combined factors indicate a congressional intent to
strengthen citizen suit enforcement of the CWA and "suggests a
strong congressional commitment to a viable role for private attor-
neys general in the enforcement of environmental laws."63 "Broad
authority for private attorneys general would best effectuate [this]
intent."6 4 Citizen suit plaintiffs suing polluters that the govern-
ment is unable or unwilling to pursue supplements and enhances
government enforcement.6 5
The role of citizen suits has "blossomed under all environ-
mental statutes, [and] particularly under the CWA."66 For exam-
ple, in the first four months of 1984 there were eighty-seven
citizen suit notices filed, compared to only sixty-three EPA refer-
rals of cases to the Department of Justice in the first six months of
1984.67 The rise in numbers of citizen suits is the result of a
number of factors. First, an increase in the scope of regulated ac-
tivities has increased the number of potential violators.68 Second,
citizens recognize that regulations are meaningless unless ade-
quately enforced. 69 Finally, and most importantly, the decline in
the federal government's enforcement activity in the early 1980s
fostered public distrust in the government's ability to carry out the
purpose and the spirit of the CWA.70
Citizen suits are now an essential means of enforcing envi-
ronmental laws. "[C]itizen suits have become more than an occa-
sionally used safety valve. Under the Clean Water Act they are
now the dominantly used federal judicial enforcement mecha-
61. "Congress' continued strong support of citizen suits in the recent Clean
Water Act amendments stems, in part, from [a] distrust of executive enforcement."
Jeanette L. Austin, The Rise of Citizen-Suit Enforcement in Environmental Law:
Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys General, 81 Nw. U.L. Rev. 220, 233
(1987).
62. Nagel, supra note 9, at 562.
63. Austin, supra note 61, at 261.
64. Nagel, supra note 9, at 562.
65. Austin, supra note 61, at 261.
66. Nagel, supra note 9, at 559.
67. Id, at n.192.
68. Austin, supra note 61, at 233.
69. Id.
70. Id "Citizen suit enforcement under all environmental statutes has in-
creased in importance, in part because of a decrease in federal enforcement."
Nagel, supra note 9, at 560; see supra note 67 and accompanying text (1984 figures




nism."71  The CWA is not being enforced by the government,
which is either unwilling or unequipped to take the necessary ac-
tions against CWA permit violators.72 Thus, precluding citizen
suits against a CWA violator who has filed a bankruptcy petition
allows the bankrupt polluter to escape its CWA permit obligations.
To compensate for the lack of government enforcement, the
enforcement power of the private attorney general73 should be
identical to that of the state or the administrator. Treating private
attorney general enforcement of environmental laws as less impor-
tant than public attorney general enforcement, by not allowing cit-
izen suits against bankrupt polluters, often means that
environmental laws go unenforced.74 This threatens the integrity
of the environment and the spirit of the CWA. Private attorneys
general "are not to be treated as nuisances or troublemakers but
rather as welcomed participants in the vindication of environmen-
tal interests."7 Both private attorneys general and the EPA rep-
resent these interests in environmental litigation and should both
be allowed to seek the remedy of injunctive relief against bank-
71. Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws
(pt. 1), 13 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,309, 10,314 (1983).
72. See Austin, supra note 61, at 261. ("One major reason for such congres-
sional persistence is distrust of the EPA's ability (or willingness) to enforce... the
law.") "The basic argument for the [citizen suit] provision is plain: namely, that
[g]overnment is simply not equipped to take court action against the numerous vio-
lations of legislation of this type which are likely to occur." 116 Cong. Rec. 33,104
(1970) (statement of Senator Hart).
73. The term private attorneys general is based on the proposition that:
Instead of designating the [a]ttorney [g]eneral... Congress can consti-
tutionally enact a statute conferring on any non-official person, or on a
designated group of non-official persons, authority to bring suit to pre-
vent action by an officer in violation of his statutory powers; for then
... there is an actual controversy, and there is nothing constitutionally
prohibiting Congress from empowering any person, official or not, to
institute a proceeding involving such a controversy even if the sole
purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such persons, so author-
ized, are, so to speak, private [a]ttorney [g]enerals.
Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). 'This view of the citi-
zen-plaintiff expands the executive authority to include [c]ongressionally desig-
nated citizens as a substitute for government enforcement." Anderson, supra note
44, at 56.
74. See, e.g., Revere Copper Products v. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc.
(In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.), 29 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 32
Bankr. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citizen suit to enforce CWA precluded by automatic
stay); see also supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text (increase in number of en-
vironmental citizen suits and decline in government enforcement of environmental
laws indicate that citizen suits are a vital means of enforcing CWA).
75. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976). The citizen
suit provisions of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act are designed "to en-
courage citizen participation rather than to treat it as [a] curiosity or a theoretical
remedy." Id.; see also Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1531, 1536
(M.D. Penn. 1985); Proffitt v. Commissioners, 754 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 1985).
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rupt polluters. "The standards for which enforcement would be
sought either under administrative enforcement or through citizen
enforcement procedures are the same. Therefore the participation
of citizens in the courts seeking enforcement of water pollution
control requirements should not result in inconsistent policy." 76
Inconsistent policy and unequal treatment have resulted,
however, from the courts' interpretation of the conflict between
the Bankruptcy Code and the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provi-
sion. While governmental units are allowed to sue bankrupt pol-
luters for injunctive relief, private attorneys general have been
precluded by the courts' narrow reading of the exception to the au-
tomatic stay provision for governmental units.7 Congress' intent
in including the citizen suit provision in the CWA was to
strengthen the ability of citizens to enforce this environmental
law. The preclusion of citizen suits by the automatic stay under-
mines this intent and the policy behind the CWA citizen suit
provision.
H1. Policy and Structure of the Bankruptcy Code Automatic Stay and
Exception for Governmental Units
The Bankruptcy Act of 1879 was repealed and replaced by
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197878 in an effort to modernize
bankruptcy law to conform with social developments.79 The legis-
lative history of the revised Bankruptcy Code indicates an under-
lying intent to provide the debtor with an economic "fresh start."80
To facilitate this goal, Congress included the automatic stay provi-
sion in the Bankruptcy Code, which goes into effect upon the filing
of a bankruptcy petition.8 1
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protec-
tions provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a
breathing spell from his [or her] creditors. It stops all collec-
tion efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It per-
mits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan,
or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove
him [or her] into bankruptcy.
76. Anderson, supra note 44, at 57 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
77. See, e.g., infra notes 111-46 and accompanying text.
78. Douglas J. Smillie, When Worlds Collide: The Effect of the Bankruptcy
Stay on Environmental Cleanup Litigation, 8 Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 77, 80
(1989); see 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330.
79. Linda Johannsen, United States v. WHizco, Inc.: A Further Refinement of
the Conflict Between Bankruptcy Discharge and Environmental Cleanup Obliga-
tions, 20 Envtl. L. 207, 210 (1990).
80. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 174, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6135.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(3).
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The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without
it, certain creditors would be able to pursue their own reme-
dies against the debtor's property. Those who acted first
would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the
detriment of other creditors.8 2
The automatic stay is "[o]ne of the widely recognized benefits
of filing a bankruptcy petition, and in many cases the motivating
factor."8 3 The protection afforded by the stay is intended to be
broad in scope and "should apply to almost any type of formal or
informal action against the debtor or the property of the state."8 4
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 created protections for
all debtors regardless of financial distress, which led to the "dan-
ger that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code [could] be used to
overturn the application or enforcement of strong public policy
. . . ."85 To address this danger, Congress included the exception to
the automatic stay provision for "the commencement or continua-
tion of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce
such governmental unit's police or regulatory power."8 6 The legis-
lative history of this provision "specifically identifies actions to
prevent or stop violation of environmental laws, including actions
to fix damages for these violations, as instances of governmental
actions to enforce police or regulatory powers."87
The Bankruptcy Code limits this exception for governmental
units by making the enforcement of a money judgment subject to
82. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6296-97.
83. Smillie, supra note 78, at 80.
84. Jonathan K. Van Patten & Richard D. Puetz, Bankruptcy and Environmen-
tal Obligations: The Clash Between Private Relief and Public Policy, 35 S.D.L. Rev.
220, 230-31 (1990).
85. Id. at 220. "Congress' desire to provide debtors with a respite from creditor
pressure was tempered by a recognition that some conduct falling within the broad
reach of the stay remains necessary for the continued protection of other societal
interests." Smillie, supra note 78, at 81.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). Governmental unit is defined in the Bankruptcy Code
as follows:
"governmental unit" means United States; [s]tate; [c]ommonwealth;
[diistrict; [t]erritory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency,
or instrumentality of the United States (but not a United States
trustee while serving as a trustee in a case under this title), a [s]tate, a
[c]ommonwealth, a [d]istrict, a [t]erritory, a municipality, or a foreign
state; or other foreign or domestic government.
11 U.S.C. § 101(26).
87. Katherine Simpson Allen, Belly Up Down in the Dumps: Bankruptcy and
Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1037, 1044 (1985). "[W]here a govern-
mental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop [a] violation of fraud, environmen-
tal protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or
attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is
not stayed under the automatic stay." S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5838 (emphasis added).
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the automatic stay.8a In Ohio v. Kovacs,89 the United States
Supreme Court explained this limitation. When a legal obliga-
tion-here, to clean up a hazardous waste site-was converted to a
money judgment, the government's suit against the bankrupt obli-
gor was precluded by the automatic stay.90 Essentially, "the auto-
matic stay provision does not apply to suits to enforce the
regulatory statutes of the [s]tate, but the enforcement of such a
judgment by seeking money from the bankrupt . . . is another
matter."9 1
The Kovacs Court, however, made clear that the stay only
precludes a suit by a governmental unit when it is suing a bank-
rupt polluter for a money judgment. A governmental unit can sue
a debtor for an injunction pursuant to its police and regulatory
powers to protect the health and safety of the public when the
debtor is "causing, contributing to or maintaining a hazardous con-
dition. In that situation, the state's police powers will not be re-
strained by the automatic stay." 92 A debtor in possession cannot
hide behind the automatic stay to avoid having to comply with en-
vironmental laws. "Plainly, that person or firm may not maintain
a nuisance, pollute the waters of the [s]tate, or refuse to remove
the source of such conditions. 9 3
When a governmental unit brings an action against a bank-
rupt polluter to force compliance with environmental laws solely
through an injunction, the action is not one for a money judgment
and thus not subject to the stay even if the injunctive relief re-
quires the expenditure of money by the debtor.94 While an effort
88. "The filing of a petition... does not operate as a stay.... (5) under subsec-
tion (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money
judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce
such governmental unit's police or regulatory power." 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (em-
phasis added). The legislative history to § 362(b)(5) states that "the exception ex-
tends to permit an injunction and enforcement of an injunction, and to permit the
entry of a money judgment, but does not extend to permit enforcement of a money
judgment." S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5838.
89. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
90. Id at 283.
91. Id. at 282 n.ll.
92. Smillie, supra note 78, at 85.
93. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285.
94. Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 277-79 (3d
Cir. 1984). The issue turns on whether the injury is one which is "traditionally rec-
tified by a money judgment and its enforcement." Id. at 278. "lAin equitable action
to prevent future harm [does] not constitute an action to enforce a money judg-
ment. The automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362 is therefore inapplicable."
Id. at 278-79; see also United States v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 804 F.2d 348
(6th Cir. 1986) (government action under CWA for an injunction against bankrupt
corporation excepted from the automatic stay). If the government's action:
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to seek execution on the judgment will be precluded by the auto-
matic stay,95 the government can sue a bankrupt corporation for
an injunction and for entry of a money judgment under its police
and regulatory powers. 96 The policy behind allowing governmen-
tal units to enjoin and enter a judgment against bankrupt polluters
is to facilitate the enforcement of environmental laws.97 Govern-
mental actions to fix damages and to "determin[e] the severity and
effect of discharges on the receiving waters are actions to protect
the public health and safety" and are purely regulatory.98 Thus, a
suit by the government for an injunction to compel a bankrupt
corporation to comply with environmental laws is excepted from
the shield against money judgments afforded to the debtor by the
automatic stay.
To facilitate the enforcement of laws to protect the environ-
ment, the judicial trend has been to broaden governmental units'
abilities to enforce environmental laws against bankrupt corpora-
tions. Consistent with this trend, the court in City of New York v.
Exxon Corp.99 held that a municipality is a governmental unit for
purposes of the exception to the automatic stay. 0 0 The court
noted that "a broad reading" of the provision of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
is to carry out the government's police or regulatory power then there
should be no stay.... If on the other hand, [the] proceeding concerns
the enforcement or collection of a money judgment then the filing of
the Chapter 11 petition should operate to stay [the] proceeding and the
penalty monies would be subject to the bankruptcy court.
804 F.2d at 350.
95. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1988). The govern-
ment successfully argued in Nicolet that it could "obtain a verdict and entry of
judgment, consistent with § 362(b)(4) and not run afoul of the money judgment ex-
ception so long as it did not seek execution on the judgment." Van Patten & Puetz,
supra note 84, at 235.
96. 857 F.2d at 210. "[Ilt was Congress' intent that proceedings such as this be
exempt from the automatic stay up to and including entry of a monetary judg-
ment." 1d,; see supra note 87 and accompanying text (legislative history of excep-
tion to automatic stay for governmental units, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), indicates that
the governmental unit suing to prevent violation of environmental law may "fix
damages for violation of such a law" consistent with its police and regulatory
powers).
97. See 857 F.2d at 207. The police and regulatory power exception to the auto-
matic stay, which exempts governmental units from the stay up to and including
entry of a money judgment, "embod[ies] Congress' recognition that enforcement of
the environmental protection laws merits a higher priority than the debtor's rights
to a 'cease fire' or the creditor's right to an orderly administration of the estate."
Id.
98. Word v. Commerce Oil Co. (In re Commerce Oil Co.), 847 F.2d 291, 296 (6th
Cir. 1988).
99. 112 Bankr. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
100. 1& at 546.
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1980 (CERCLA),101 giving the city standing to sue, "is entirely con-
sistent with the overall purpose of the Act."102 Here, the action by
the city for injunctive relief and to fix damages was "exempt from
the automatic stay because it is undertaken pursuant to the police
or regulatory powers of a governmental unit."103 The court's
broad reading illustrates the judicial trend of concern over envi-
ronmental violations by bankrupt corporations.
The courts have interpreted the exception to the automatic
stay to allow suits by federal, state and local governments against
bankrupt polluters to strengthen enforcement of environmental
laws. The courts, however, have closed the door on citizen en-
forcement of environmental laws against bankrupt polluters by ex-
cluding private attorneys general from the class of governmental
units with the ability to sue a bankrupt polluter for injunctive re-
lief. This narrow interpretation contravenes congressional intent
to make CWA citizen suits a vital enforcement tool. Excluding pri-
vate attorneys general from the definition of governmental units
frustrates enforcement of the CWA against bankrupt polluters.
III. Cases Illustrating the Courts' Refusal to Treat Private Attorneys
General as Governmental Units
Enforcement of the CWA is frustrated by case law, which re-
fuses to give private attorneys general the same ability as public
attorneys general to sue bankrupt corporations for violations of
environmental laws. A citizen suit to compel a polluter to cease its
ongoing violations was thwarted by bankruptcy in Revere Copper
Products, Inc. v. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. (In re Re-
vere Copper & Brass, Inc.).l0 4 Hudson River Sloop Clearwater,
Inc. and Natural Resources Defense Council, both non-profit envi-
ronmental public interest groups, gave the proper sixty-day notice
of intent to sue Revere Copper Products, Inc. (RCPI), a New York
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
copper and copper alloy products.105 The plaintiffs intended to sue
RCPI for violations of its permit to discharge hazardous pollutants
into the Mohawk River.l ° 6 After receiving notice of the citizens'
intent to sue, RCPI filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982), as amended by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
102. 112 Bankr. at 546 (citing City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677,
685 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
103. Id. at 546 (citation omitted); see 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5)(1982).
104. 29 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), affl'd, 32 Bankr. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
105. 32 Bankr. at 726.
106. 29 Bankr. at 585, 32 Bankr. at 726.
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ruptcy Code, which enacted the automatic stay.107
The two citizen groups then filed a complaint in district court
against RCPI. In the complaint, the plaintiffs requested relief, in-
cluding an order declaring RCPI to be in violation of the CWA and
an injunction preventing RCPI from operating its facility in viola-
tion of its permit.'0 The plaintiffs, acting as private attorneys
general pursuant to the section 505 citizen suit provision of the
CWA,109 chose to take enforcement action against RCPI "because
[RCPI] [was] among those companies with a persistent and historic
pattern of permit non-compliance and because there had been no
diligent prosecution . .. by [f]ederal and state authorities.""i 0 De-
spite RCPI's blatant violations, the citizen suit was permanently
enjoined by the bankruptcy court based on the automatic stay."'
On appeal, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's
finding that environmental public interest groups were not govern-
mental units for the purpose of applying the 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)
exception to the automatic stay.112 The court justified its determi-
nation that "private attorney generals seeking to enforce the envi-
ronmental laws" are not "given the same status as governmental
units with respect to bankrupt defendants" by limiting the Bank-
ruptcy Code's definition of governmental units to "true govern-
mental entities.""13  Citing the legislative history of this
definition,"i 4 the court concluded that "[c]learly, both the statutory
language and the legislative history demonstrate that the term
'governmental unit' in the [B]ankruptcy [C]ode refers exclusively
to actual governmental groups and not to organizations acting in
[the] governmental capacity."1 5
The court's narrow interpretation of governmental unit, how-
ever, ignores the role given to private attorneys general by Con-
gress, which expressly made citizen suits an integral part of the
107. 29 Bankr. at 585, 32 Bankr. at 726.
108. 29 Bankr. at 585-86.
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982); see also supra note 73 (explanation of private attor-
ney general concept).
110. 29 Bankr. at 586.
111. 29 Bankr. at 589; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(3)(1982).
112. 32 Bankr. at 728; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (exception to the automatic stay
for governmental units).
113. 32 Bankr. at 727; see 11 U.S.C. § 101(26) (definition of governmental unit).
114. 32 Bankr. at 727. "Entities that operate through state action such as
through the grant of a charter or license, and have no further connection with the
state or federal government are not within the contemplation of the definition." Id.
(citation omitted).
115. 32 Bankr. at 727 (emphasis added).
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enforcement scheme of the CWA.116 Congress gave private attor-
neys general more power than a mere grant of a charter or li-
cense.117 The citizen suit provision empowers private attorneys
general to fill the enforcement void created by the absence of gov-
ernment enforcement suits and makes citizen suits a substitute for
inadequate, government enforcement.11s Furthermore, citizen
suits are an essential means of enforcing environmental laws be-
cause they "are now the dominantly used federal judicial enforce-
ment mechanism" under the CWA-more dominantly used than
government enforcement."l 9 The vital role that citizen suits play
in enforcing environmental laws compels a broad reading of the
Bankruptcy Code's definition of governmental unit, which would
include private attorneys general as "instrumentalit[ies] of the
United States."'120 Excepting both government and citizen enforce-
ment actions for injunctions against polluting debtors from the au-
tomatic stay would facilitate enforcement of laws to preserve and
protect the environment.' 2 '
In accordance with the policy of giving citizens the authority
to enforce environmental laws, a federal district court in Illinois v.
Electrical Utilities 122 allowed a suit by the state "on behalf of its
citizens"123 to proceed despite the filing of bankruptcy by the de-
fendant, Electrical Utilities Company (EUC).124 The state brought
the action against EUC alleging that EUC had violated the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA)125 by dumping polychlorinated bi-
phenyls (PCBs) on EUC's manufacturing site.' 26 Although the
state sued EUC under the citizen's civil actions provision of
TSCA,127 the court found that the suit was allowable under the ex-
116. See supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text (citizen suits' integral role in
CWA enforcement scheme).
117. See supra note 114.
118. See Anderson, supra note 47, at 56 (private attorneys general defined as
"[c]ongressionally designated citizens" who are "a substitute for government
enforcement").
119. Miller, supra note 71, at 10,314; see also supra notes 66-70 and accompany-
ing text (recent increase in citizen enforcement suits under the CWA and the lack
of adequate enforcement of the CWA by the government).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 101(26).
121. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (enforcement of the CWA
would be increased if the courts would treat private attorney general suits for in-
junctions against bankrupt polluters the same as public attorney general suits for
the same relief).
122. 41 Bankr. 874 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
123. Id at 876.
124. Id. at 877.
125. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1976).
126. 41 Bankr. at 875.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 2619. Section 2619, like the CWA citizen suit provision, is
modeled after the CAA citizen suit provision. "All of the citizen suit provisions in-
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ception to the automatic stay for governmental units.128 The court
determined that the state acting "on behalf of its citizens" was act-
ing as "parens patriae. The parens patriae power is the power to
intervene on behalf of another party who cannot protect his or her
own rights."129 Here, "[t]he private right of a citizen to obtain re-
lief under the TSCA coincides with the [s]tate's interest in protect-
ing its citizens from PCB pollution." 30 Thus, the court allowed
the suit to proceed solely because of the state's intervention in the
suit.
The court addressed the Revere Copper Products court's im-
position and affirmation of a permanent injunction against a citi-
zen's group attempt to bring a suit against a polluting debtor,131 by
noting that:
the court. .. focused on the identity of the plaintiff instead of
the statute creating the cause of action.... The stay exception
failed to apply because a private organization, not the state,
brought the action.... If the state had brought the action, it
would have been exercising its police power to protect its
citizens.132
Although RCPI and EUC were both corporate polluters that had
declared bankruptcy and were engaged in ongoing violations of en-
vironmental laws, the cases were distinguished based on whether
the proper plaintiff had brought the suit.
This distinction, made by the federal district court in Electri-
cal Utilities between that case and Revere Copper Products, is un-
justifiable. In both cases, a suit was brought by citizen groups who
had standing to sue and pursuant to an environmental statute
which authorizes citizen suits. In both cases, the citizens' interests
coincided with the states' interest in suing a bankrupt polluter to
enforce environmental laws to protect the public's health and
safety. The only difference is technical: in Electrical Utilities, the
state intervened in the action, while in Revere Copper Products,
the citizens themselves attempted to enforce the environmental
law against the bankrupt corporation. The discrepancy between
the two courts' results presents a clear injustice: in the Illinois
case, the polluter was sued for an injunction, while in the New
corporate procedural protections to limit the scope of citizen suits and ensure their
proper role in enforcement." Nagel, supra note 9, at 533.
128. 41 Bankr. at 876.
129. Id. at 876 (citation omitted).
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
132. 41 Bankr. at 876; see Revere Copper Products, Inc. v. Hudson River Sloop
Clearwater, Inc. (In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.), 29 Bankr. 584, 587-88 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 32 Bankr. 725, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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York case, the polluter was allowed to continue violating the CWA.
This inequitable result demeans the vital enforcement role of citi-
zen suits and perpetuates harm to the environment.
A citizen suit against a bankrupt corporation was once again
precluded by the Southern District of New York Bankruptcy
Court in In re Chateaugay Corp.133 The court agreed with the rea-
soning in Revere Copper Products 13 4 and held that "to the extent
Sportfishing relies on the Code § 362(b)(4) governmental unit ex-
ception, that section is not applicable, and therefore, it is barred by
the automatic stay.., from filing suit against the [d]ebtors."1 35 In
its opinion, the court emphasized the policy and the legislative his-
tory behind the automatic stay of protecting the debtor.138
Because of its emphasis on debtor protection, the court re-
fused to broaden the Bankruptcy Code's express authorization of a
suit by a governmental unit against a bankrupt polluter to allow
Sportfishing's citizen suit to proceed. As a result, LTV, which had
continued to violate its CWA permit after it filed a Chapter 11 peti-
tion, was protected from a suit for an injunction to compel it to
stop discharging excessive amounts of hazardous pollutants into
northern Minnesota's pristine lakes and streams. 137 In this case,
the automatic stay's purpose of protecting the debtor from undue
harassment did not justify precluding Sportfishing's proposed citi-
zen suit. When a corporate debtor continues to violate environ-
mental laws after filing a bankruptcy petition, it should not be
allowed to continue polluting just because a private attorney gen-
eral rather than the government attempts to bring an enforcement
action.
Sportfishing's citizen suit was precluded also because the
court determined that Sportfishing had not shown cause to lift the
stay.'3 8 The court found that LTV's violations were "already being
addressed" by LTV and the PCA.139 This finding was made de-
spite an affidavit submitted by the director of the PCA's Water
133. 118 Bankr. 19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); see supra notes 15-35 and accompany-
ing text.
134. 29 Bankr. 584; see supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
135. In re Chateaugay, 118 Bankr. at 22.
136. I& at 22-23; see supra note 82 and accompanying text (legislative history to
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(3)).
137. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text (LTV's ongoing violations of
its CWA permit).
138. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (relief from the stay "for cause").
139. In re Chateaugay, 118 Bankr. at 23. The court referred to the 1985 Stipula-
tion Agreement between the PCA and Erie Mining Company. As previously dis-
cussed, the terms of this agreement had become inadequate to address the




Quality Division attesting to the fact that the PCA lacks resources
to prosecute all violations of the CWA. The affidavit also asserted
that the PCA would welcome a citizen suit by Sportfishing against
LTV. "A successful citizen suit requiring the permittee's compli-
ance with the NPDES permit terms and conditions . . . would
likely supplemen not supplant, the Agency's current administra-
tive enforcement action .... 10140
This testimony was dismissed by the bankruptcy court. "The
affidavit ... is unpersuasive" and the state "has not appeared or
taken any official position on this application."141 "[Tihe position
of Sportfishing that the proposed suit will act as a stimulus or prod
for corrective action is not supported by the facts" and thus "there
has been no cause shown to permit litigation by Sportfishing
.... "142 The court declined to give credence to the statement of
the water quality director and precluded Sportfishing from pursu-
ing its proposed litigation.143
In refusing to allow Sportfishing to bring suit against LTV,
the court ignored the failure of LTV and the state to remedy
LTV's ongoing violations of its CWA permit. LTV's continuing
noncompliance, combined with the lack of adequate enforcement
by the PCA, were the impetus for Sportfishing's attempt to bring a
citizen suit to enjoin LTV's polluting activities. The PCA admit-
tedly was unable to effectively enforce the CWA with respect to
LTV. Because the governmental unit which was responsible for
enforcing the CWA was not taking any judicial action against LTV,
a suit by Sportfishing was essential to the enforcement of the CWA
and to the preservation of the waters near Dunka Mine.
Because of the absence of adequate, government enforcement7
efforts, Sportfishing's citizen suit should not have been precluded
by LTV's bankruptcy. The automatic stay's purpose of protecting
the debtor and providing the debtor with a fresh start makes sense
when the stay is applied to a creditor seeking a money judgment
against the debtor. Here, however, Sportfishing was seeking non-
monetary, injunctive relief against a debtor who continued to vio-
late the CWA. Taking this into account, the court could have ex-
panded the Bankruptcy Code's definition of governmental unit to
140. Affidavit of Timothy K. Scherkenbach at paras. 6-8, In re Chateaugay Corp.,
118 Bankr. 19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (No. 86 B 11273 (BRL))(emphasis added).
141. In re COhateaugay, 118 Bankr. at 23.
142. Id. "Since the Mining Company under the active oversight and involvement
of the Agency is working to resolve the environmental problems, and currently has
proposed and implemented remedial activity for correcting these problems, the pro-
posed lawsuit constitutes an enjoinable surplus activity imposing burdens that are
not offset by any discernable benefit." Id. at 24.
143. Id at 24.
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except Sportfishing, acting as an "instrumentality of the United
States,"144 from the restriction of the automatic stay. Instead,
under the guise of debtor protection, the court refused to allow
Sportfishing's citizen suit to enjoin a bankrupt corporation from
continuing to violate environmental laws and to endanger the pub-
lic health and safety.
IV. Reconciling the Conflict Between Clean Water Act Citizen Suits
and the Automatic Stay
The exception to the automatic stay for suits by governmen-
tal units to enjoin bankrupt polluters145 gives effect to a congres-
sional intent to facilitate enforcement of environmental laws to
protect the health and safety of the public.'4 6 But while the auto-
matic stay does not restrict governmental units from enjoining and
obtaining the entry of money judgments against polluting debtors,
the stay's restriction does stifle legitimate citizen suits against
bankrupt polluters. Courts have been reluctant to interpret the
exception to the automatic stay more broadly to include private at-
torneys general as "instrumentalit[ies] of the United States."'147
Thus, citizen suits by private attorneys general for injunctions
against bankrupt corporations violating environmental laws have
not been allowed to proceed, even in the absence of adequate en-
forcement by the government.
When a governmental unit has not taken adequate enforce-
ment measures, suits by private attorneys general for injunctions
against bankrupt polluters should not be subject to the automatic
stay. In including the citizen suit provision in the CWA, "Congress
. . . determined that the advantages of private attorneys general
outweigh the disadvantages."' 14 "Given Congress' intention to pro-
vide citizens liberal access to enforce the Act, as well as the statu-
tory safeguards against abusive litigation, a court-developed
doctrine that precludes citizen suits when no court action has com-
menced appears to contravene Congress' intention.''1 49 The courts'
refusal to allow citizen suits against polluting debtors results in a
clash between the goals of two federal statutes-the CWA and the
Bankruptcy Code-which needs to be recognized and confronted.
144. 11 U.S.C. § 101(26).
145. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).
146. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text (cases where the courts have
allowed governmental units to sue bankrupt polluters for injunctions pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)).
147. 11 U.S.C. § 101(26).
148. Nagel, supra note 9, at 533.
149. Robinson, supra note 4, at 521-22 (emphasis added).
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Congress has determined, in enacting the exception to the au-
tomatic stay, that the goal of enforcing environmental laws by gov-
ernmental units through an injunction overrides the goal of
protection of the debtor. This policy should be applied to allow
suits against bankrupt polluters by private attorneys general acting
as a substitute for government enforcement. The non-monetary,
injunctive relief sought by citizen suits is identical to the relief
which a government suit could seek from a bankrupt corporation
which is violating environmental laws. Because private attorneys
general bringing suits for injunctions are not seeking private
money damages, citizen suits against bankrupt polluters do not de-
stroy the policy behind the automatic stay of protecting the debtor
from harassment by creditors.i50
The preclusion of citizen suits by the automatic stay does,
however, destroy the CWA citizen suit provision's policy of spur-
ring and supplementing governmental enforcement of the CWA.151
This policy makes citizen suits vital to the goal of preserving our
nation's waters-a goal which should not depend on who brings
suit to enjoin corporate pollution. Enforcement of the CWA
against debtors through injunctions should not be thwarted simply
because the plaintiff is a citizens' group rather than a governmen-
tal unit. Under current law, water is protected if the suit is
brought against a bankrupt polluter by the government and unpro-
tected if the suit is brought by citizens. This inequitable result
threatens the environmental integrity of our nation's waters and
should not be tolerated.
The conflict between the Clean Water Act and the Bank-
ruptcy Code needs to be addressed, whether through legislative re-
form or through judicial balancing. The "balancing the equities"
approach weighs the conflicting goals of "protecting the public
health and safety (environmental) against . . . the threat to the
economic interest of the debtor, the government, and other credi-
tors (economic)."' 5 2 However, because governmental units' ability
to bring suit against bankrupt, polluting corporations pursuant to
the exception to the automatic stay' 53 is undisputed, balancing the
environmental and economic goals of the statutes is not the issue
at stake in the conflict. The only issue which Congress needs to
address is whether private attorneys general should be allowed to
bring suit against polluting debtors in lieu of enforcement by true
150. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
151. See Austin, supra note 61, at 236.
152. Johannsen, supra note 79, at 226.
153. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).
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governmental units. Thus, the conflict between citizen suits and
the automatic stay could be most effectively addressed by congres-
sional action to define the role of private attorneys general in en-
forcing environmental laws against bankrupt polluters.
The vital role of private attorneys general in CWA enforce-
ment stems from the lack of adequate enforcement by the govern-
ment. Congress should recognize citizens' vital enforcement role
by amending the Bankruptcy Code to exempt environmental citi-
zen suits for injunctive relief against bankrupt polluters from the
automatic stay. The private attorneys general are acting as a sub-
stitute for governmental units, and thus their suits to enjoin bank-
rupt polluters should be allowed to proceed. Because citizen suits
under the CWA are the "dominantly used federal judicial enforce-
ment mechanism,"'154 the private attorneys general should not be
subordinate, but should be given authority equal to that of govern-
mental units when enforcing environmental laws. Unequal treat-
ment of private attorneys general threatens the environment by
diminishing the viability of citizen suits in enforcing the Clean
Water Act.
V. Suggestions for Reform
The present state of conflict between the environmental stat-
utes and the Bankruptcy Code is unacceptable. Congress
should act to clarify the relationship between the statutes.
The Bankruptcy Code should not supersede all other federal
legislation to the detriment of the health and safety of the
public and the quality of the environment. 155
The problem addressed in this article should ideally be reme-
died by legislative reform. Congress should amend the Bank-
ruptcy Code to include a specific exception from the automatic
stay for environmental suits by private attorneys general to enjoin
bankrupt polluters. Such an amendment would not undermine
the Bankruptcy Code's purposes of protecting the debtor from har-
assment and of providing the debtor with a "fresh start."156 Citi-
zen suits could only be brought pursuant to the four requirements
under the CWA and would be brought not to harass or drain the
estate of the debtor, but solely to enjoin the debtor from violating
environmental laws. 157 Amending the Bankruptcy Code to allow
154. Miller, supra note 71, at 10,314.
155. Johannsen, supra note 79, at 227.
156. See supra note 82 (legislative history of automatic stay).
157. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text (requirements of standing, no-
tice, lack of diligent prosecution and ongoing violation, and the case law effectively
limiting citizen suits to injunctive relief).
[Vol. 9:469
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
citizen suits against corporate polluters that have filed bankruptcy
petitions would facilitate the enforcement of other important fed-
eral statutes-federal environmental laws such as the Clean Water
Act.
Given the narrow interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) by
the bankruptcy courts that precludes private attorneys general
from bringing environmental suits against bankrupt corporations,
judicial reform to facilitate the enforcement of environmental laws
against debtors seems unlikely. If the courts could be persuaded to
construe liberally the existing automatic stay exception for govern-
mental units to allow citizens to sue bankrupt violators of environ-
mental laws, corporate debtors could be forced to comply with
these laws. Because of their vital role in enforcing environmental
laws, private attorneys general should be included in the exception
to the automatic stay for governmental units. Allowing citizen
suits for injunctions against bankrupt polluters to proceed would
eliminate the law's current inequality created by staying these
suits, when an identical governmental suit would be excepted from
the stay. Furthermore, private attorneys general suits against pol-
luting debtors for injunctive relief would facilitate enforcement of
the Clean Water Act and protect the health and safety of the
public.
VI. Conclusion
In light of the policy considerations behind both the Clean
Water Act and the Bankruptcy Code, citizen suits for injunctions
against bankrupt polluters should not be precluded by the Bank-
ruptcy Code's automatic stay. Suits by private attorneys general,
who satisfy the Clean Water Act's section 505 requirements,
should be allowed to proceed when a governmental unit is unable
or unwilling to bring an enforcement action. Often, governmental
units do not have the time, resources, and/or incentive to bring
suit against a corporate polluter violating its permit. If suits by
concerned and affected citizens are not excepted from the auto-
matic stay, polluters can use the filing of bankruptcy to avoid hav-
ing to comply with environmental laws.
Citizen suits are an essential means of enforcing the Clean
Water Act. Under the exception to the automatic stay for govern-
mental units, suits by the government against bankrupt polluters
are allowed despite corporations' filings of bankruptcy. If the in-
tegrity of our nation's waters is to be protected, private attorneys
general, acting in the place of the government, should be given the
same right to sue bankrupt polluters as the public attorney gen-
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eral. The courts have been reluctant to interpret the exception for
governmental units to allow for environmental citizen suits against
bankrupt corporations. To empower private attorneys general to
force bankrupt corporations to comply with environmental laws,
Congress must amend the Bankruptcy Code to provide that envi-
ronmental citizen suits for injunctive relief against corporate pol-
luters are excepted from the automatic stay.
